Types of Information Flow

In a previous post a week or so ago, I riffed on an example of communication between two mountain hikers suggested by Barwise and Seligman (authors of a theory of “information flow”). I made the initial distinction between information flowing within a shared context (in the example, this was the context of Morse Code and flashlight signals), and information flowing from observations of physical phenomenon.
Both types of information movement is covered by Barwise and Seligman’s theory. I propose a further classification of various examples of information flow which will become important as we discuss the operations of individuals across and within bridging contexts.

Types of Flows

Symbols are created within a context for various reasons. There’s a difference between generic information flow and symbollic communication.
Let’s consider a single event whereby information has flowed and been recognized by a person. There are three possible scenarios which may have occurred.

1. Observation/Perception: the person experiences some physical sensation; the conditions of some physical perception leads the person within the context of that perception (and his mental state) to recognize the sensation as significant. In this case, the person recognizes that something has occurred that was important enough to become consciously aware of it’s occurrence. This is new information, but is not necessarily symbollic information.

2. Inference/Deduction: A person within the mental state corresponding to a particular context applies a set of “rules of thumb” over a set of observations (of the first type, likely, but not necessarily exclusively). Drawing on logical inference defined by his current context, he draws a conclusion which follows from these observations to generate new information. This is new information in the sense that without the context to define the rules of inference, those particular perceptions would not have resulted in the “knowledge” of the inference conclusion. They would remain (or they would dissipate) uninterpretted and unrelated forever.

3. Interpretation/Translation: This is the only type of information flow that happens using exclusively symbollic mechanisms. In this type of flow, the person receiving the flow recognizes not only the physical event, but also that the observed phenomenon is symbollic: in other words, that some other person has applied additional meaning to the phenomenon (created a symbol or symbols from the physical media by attaching an additional concept to it). In this type of flow, the perceiving person doesn’t simply register the fact of the physical event, but also recognizes that the physical phenomenon satisfies some context-driven rules of material selection and construction indicating that some other person intentionally constructed it. From this knowledge, the perceiver concludes, assuming they are familiar with the encoding paradigm of the sender’s context, that there is an intended, additional message (meaning) associated with the event. The perceiving party is said to share the context of the sending party if they are also able to interpret/translate the perceived physical sign to recognize the concepts placed there by the sender. In this scenario, the person recieving the message is NOT creating new information. All of the information of this flow was first realized and generated by the message’s sender. (This will be an important detail later as we apply this trichotomy to the operation of software.)

In all three types of information flows, as described by Barwise and Seligman, the flow is dependent on the regularities of the physical world. This regularity requirement applies from the regularity of physical phenomenon, to the reliability of the perceptual apparatus of the perceiver, all the way to the consistency of the encoding paradigm defined by the sender’s context.

Peirce’s Modes of Relationship

According to a terrific survey book on semiotics by Daniel Chandler that I’m reading now, Charles Peirce defined types of signs by whether they were symbollic, iconic, or indexical. If I understand Chandler’s summary, the first two examples of information flow I’ve described are at minimum dependent on Peirce’s indexical signs, alternatively called “natural signs”, because these are the natural perception of reality independent of context. Both the iconic and symbollic signs are only recognizable within a context making both fall under my “interpretation” type of information flow.

For the most part, I will treat the iconic and symbollic signs as the same sort of thing for now.

Bridging Contexts

If it’s true that every human grouping can form its own context, how can communication occur between different groups? If one group defines a set of symbols using some set of concepts and a syntactic media that is different from those of another group, as a practical matter, how can the chasm be spanned? The answer is through the development of bridging contexts.

The following figure depicts several common strategies, each with its particular benefits and drawbacks.

Three Types of Bridging Contexts

Three Types of Bridging Contexts Within One Corporate Organization

There are three basic forms of bridging contexts. First and perhaps the most common in the real world is the creation of a specific, point-to-point bridging context through discussions/negotiations between the representatives of the two specific contexts. Most organizations take this approach because it simplifies, focuses and shortens the discussion, leading to faster turn-around. All application and data interfaces that are custom-built as point-to-point connections, no matter what the actual transmission protocol or language used, fall into this category.

The second form of bridging context occurs when two groups rely on a pre-existing, parent context to act as the bridge. The parent context may push a common context down onto the previously individual contexts, or the two contexts may appeal to the parent to resolve the conflict. In either case, the result can be that the child contexts become absorbed by the parent context, thus eventually what began as a bridging context becomes the entire context. These forms of bridging contexts are often common in such situations as corporate mergers, enterprise architecture initiatives, and business process reengineering projects.

The third form of bridging context is found whenever an organization selects a third-party standard as a communications protocol. In these cases, the organization creates a bridging context between itself and the external standard, including mapping its symbols into those of the standard. Theoretically, once completed, the organization can use such a bridging context to communicate with other organizations that have likewise built bridges to the standard. In practicality, however, it is not uncommon that organizations will bias their bridging context to their own point of view. When this happens, the external standard devolves into mere syntax, and other organizations must create new, subtle bridging contexts (a la form number one) in order to communicate successfully with this organization. This was a common occurrence in the heyday of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), and still occurs today even with more modern, XML-based standards.

While proponents of standards bodies decry other approaches, it must be stated that the third form of bridging context is also the most complicated to develop, as well as requiring the longest amount of time to establish, and is often the hardest to maintain. The reason for this is that it requires so many more people to define, and for most situations, the key to its success is also its biggest drawback, namely that the context is defined externally to the organization. Thus, the interplay among the membership of the standards body creates the external context. The organization has a business activity establishes the local context. The humans involved in establishing the bridging context must be able to translate from the local context to the external standard. There is always a risk that these individuals will misunderstand the external standard and translate their local context to it incorrectly. In addition, the bridging context must be maintained constantly as changes occur both in the standard and in the internal organization. At least within the local context, it is more likely that a change will be noticed.

In addition to EDI and XML protocols, other examples of the third form of bridging context would include Semantic Web approaches, but also such mundane approaches as the use of ERP systems, or any other packaged application where a fixed syntactic media is presented.

Overlapping Context and Fuzzy Edges

Parent-Child Context Relationships: Intersection/Union


The following figures depict some notional ideas for how to graphically describe some of the interesting relationships among contexts as they occur in a large, formal organization. The idea occurred to me that there must be some way of describing the similarities and differences in the concepts and discourse of the various subgroups of an organization (any organization). In the diagram, each oval represents a defined organizational group established by the business to allocate and accomplish all of the work necessary for the business to function. Each oval within another oval represents a specific group of individuals working in that business, until we reach the largest oval representing all employees in all groups. Even this largest oval exists in a larger context, that of the culture at large.

The discussion which follows touches on some incomplete ideas about how the concepts, signs and symbols within a given context relate to those of both smaller child and larger parent contexts.

Graphical depiction of Parent Child Contexts

Above: A Bird's Eye View of Nested Contexts; Below: Cross Section View of Nested Contexts

“Inheritance” of concept flows down from the broadest context down to the lowest context. This is not like the inheritance of properties in an object oriented paradigm, so the term may need to be changed. The idea really is that in the absence of an explicit statement of a concept in a lower level context, the members of the community may defer to the definition of that concept from one of the broader contexts that exist above them. In other words, the larger community of humans may have defined the concept and the more detailed context may neglect to reiterate the concept, preferring instead to use the larger context’s definition.

On the other hand, any concept defined in a broader context may be re-defined at a more detailed level. This may or may not be intentional, or even noticed by either members of the larger context or the more insular context. When noticed, it still doesn’t typically cause a problem in normal human discourse, as the humans are able to translate between each context, and hold in their minds each definition.

Contexts at different levels that do not share the same lineage may define a concept in different ways. If their members do not interact under normal circumstances, then there is still not a problem of communication or data integration. However, problems arise out of this layering and locality-driven conceptualization when the information must be shared, either tete-a-tete through direct interface (as happens in workflow integration problems) or through some roll-up to a common conceptual, parent context (as happens in reporting and business intelligence problems). This is the origin of the “single version of the truth” goal that many organizations now take as a given, best practice.

“Inheritance” of concepts flows down. What this means is that concepts defined in the parent’s broader context may still hold meaning in the more narrow child context. Exceptions/replacements are not limited to replacing concepts from the immediate parent, but can happen with any concept above. Each context layer, almost by definition, will define concepts that are uniquely their own, as well. This is one of the sources of intra-organization argument and confusion, as the same terms (syntactic medium) may be used to refer to two slightly (or even grossly) divergent ideas within the same corporate context.

Not every symbol will be meaningful in every child context, the process of transference of concepts can filter out concepts as well as borrow them. At each contextual layer, shared structure may be given different meanings. Lack of specificity/explicitness of definition at a layer does not imply automatic inheritance from above, as it can also reflect a vagueness of thought or lack of agreement about a fringe aspect.

The vacuum created, however, tends to favor the wholesale borrowing of the concept from the parent context.

Each context layer is complete in its own right. The sizes shown in the diagram suggest a size of content but this is just an artifact of the notation. A child context may define an infinite number of concepts over time, just as its parent context does. Theoretically, each context could be depicted or described in full without reference to the broader parent contexts.

Not every concept defined within any particular layer will wind up represented within some application software used by the humans participating in that context. However, if the humans in that context have acquired software to support their activities, the concepts within that system will naturally conform to the context, although they may force the context to be changed to reflect limitations and capabilities that the software imposes.

The reality is of course much more complicated than the diagram suggests. Since the context at each level is defined by the humans who inhabit and communicate within it, new members may introduce or adapt concepts from other contexts that are unrelated to the hierarchy of autonomy and control. Rather than attempt to trace the origin point of concepts across all contexts, it is recommended that these few concepts be considered  either of local origin, or as part of a bridging context between the context and the context of origin. This will have to be chosen only based on the value to be gained from either point of view.

Bridging contexts are new contexts established to bridge between some subset of concepts from each of two different contexts. These are established when new information communication between the two contexts is required. The bridging context can be recognized by the relative sparseness of the conceptual inventory, and by the fact that the lineage of the concepts is limited to two (or perhaps a handful at most) otherwise disjoint contexts.

Most transaction oriented interfaces, as well as any data interface between two functionally disparate systems (of any type) are defined within a bridging context limited to just the mediating symbols.

What a Context Is: Information Flow Theory

I’ve been busy lately, and let this discussion lapse for a bit. Let’s see if I can kickstart it again.

Sometimes, information flows from the physical world to a person who observes and interprets his perceptions to create and recognize new knowledge. Sometimes, someone creates a message in a physical medium and “sends” it into the world hoping that there will be another person who not only can sense it, but can recognize it as a message and can receive the information layered on top of the physical perception. The first is an example of simple observation and perception, the second is an example of communication within a context. While both rely on the perception of physical reality by the observer, they are fundamentally, though subtlety, different.

I have been reading a book on the mathematical theory underlying the “flow” of “information” in the real world, and while I don’t yet really understand the theory, there are some points the book is failing to make about context which I think are important.

Barwise, Jon and Seligman, Jerry, Information Flow: The Logic of Distributed Systems, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Not that the book was intended to cover the concept of context, per se, being an attempt to lay out a mathematical/logical framework for describing the flow of information across, through and between physical systems. It does have an extensive section on “local logics” which when I understand it better may help me describe my own ideas about context in a formal manner.

What struck me, and forms the origin point of today’s discussion on contexts, is the example the authors use to introduce and illustrate the technical discussion. And as you will see, it is not just the example given, but variations of it that I will use to elucidate better what a context is and is not. To get to the meat of my thinking, here is their example, as written on pages 4-5.

Judith, a keen but inexperienced mountaineer, embarked on an ascent of Mt. Ateb. She took with her a compass, a flashlight, a topographic map, and a bar of Lindt bittersweet chocolate. The map was made ten years previously, but she judged that the mountain would not have changed too much. Reaching the peak shortly after 2 P. M. she paused to eat two squares of chocolate and reflect on the majesty of her surroundings.

At 2:10 P. M. she set about the descent. Encouraged by the ease of the day’s climb, she decided to take a different route down. It was clearly indicated on the map and clearly marked on the upper slopes, but as she descended the helpful little piles of stones left by previous hikers petered out. Before long she found herself struggling to make sense of compass bearings taken from ambiguously positioned rocky outcrops and the haphazard tree line below. By 4 P. M. Judith was hopelessly lost.

Scrambling down a scree slope, motivated only by the thought that down was a better bet than up, the loose stones betrayed her, and she tumbled a hundred feet before breaking her fall against a hardy uplands thorn. Clinging to the bush and wincing atthe pain in her left leg, she took stock. It would soon be dark. Above her lay the treacherous scree, below her were perils as yet unknown. She ate the rest of the chocolate.

Suddenly, she remembered the flashlight. It was still working. She began to flash out into the twilight. By a miracle, her signal was seen by another day hiker, who was already near the foot of the mountain. Miranda quickly recognized the dots and dashes of the SOS and hurried on to her car where she phoned Mountain Rescue. Only twenty minutes later the searchlight from a helicopter scanned the precipitous east face of Mt. Ateb, illuminating the frightened Judith, still clinging to the thorn bush but now waving joyously at the aircraft.

Was Judith Lucky That Miranda Knew Morse Code?

In a word, yes. In so many ways:

  • like the fact that Miranda was near the bottom of the mountain,
  • that she had a clear view of the side of the mountain where Judith lay,
  • that she had a cell phone at the car,
  • and most importantly, Judith was indeed lucky that Miranda knew the Morse code for “SOS”.

In fact, it was also lucky that Judith herself knew the code. So in the story as given, since Judith knew the code to use when she found herself in trouble, she used her light as the syntactic medium in which she encoded a message of her need for help. The fact that Morse code is a globally standard coding scheme simply meant that both Judith and Miranda both shared a common context without ever having met. The fact of their shared knowledge of the code provided the context by which Judith was able to get her message to Miranda.

What if Miranda Didn’t Know Morse Code

Things could have been much worse for Judith if either of them had no knowledge of the code, or if neither of them did. In addition, it was lucky that Miranda was somehow aware (or realized as she was watching) that a flashing light could be used to signify such a code, and that she then obviously deduced from the repeated pattern that someone was sending a message.

Imagine what might have happened if Miranda had seen the flashing light, but didn’t recognize it as a code, and therefore didn’t try to translate what she was seeing. Instead of reacting by calling for help, she might have thought to herself “Oh look, there’s a light up on the mountain. I wonder what that is?” but then gone on about her business.

In other words, Miranda could have observed her environment and perceived the flashing light but concluded that it was simply a physical phenomenon of no particular import. She may have perceived the signal but failed to recognize it as a message. In which case, this would show that Judith and Miranda had failed to establish a context for the communication.

What if Judith didn’t know Morse Code?

If Judith didn’t know Morse Code, perhaps she would still have started waving her flashlight around. Miranda having seen the light would have no reason to recognize a code.

Would this mean Judith would be out of luck? Not necessarily, if Miranda was also an experienced hiker. Miranda being in the context of hiking, it might occur to her that there shouldn’t be a light on that part of the mountain at that moment in time. She might think to herself that the random way the light was moving, plus its position on the mountain compared with where the safe trails were, added up to someone in distress.

In this case, a message has still been sent from Judith to Miranda, with the same result. The context that Miranda was thinking in plus her perception and prior knowledge of the mountain trails, allowed her to reach a conclusion that there was someone on the mountain in trouble. But it is important to note that Judith was not in the same context as Miranda.

In fact, if Miranda was a ranger, she may have been trained to look for and recognize the behavior of people in distress. In this example, we must conclude that Judith was not actually participating in the context with Miranda. It was Miranda’s knowledge of and mindset regarding her perceptions of the dangerous mountain environment which led her to deduce the existence of a person in trouble, not the fact of Judith’s trying to send a message.

Yes, this Judith tried to send a message, but she couldn’t have known that her random wavings would be recognized in anyway. Whereas the Judith who used Morse code actually knew of a context and encoded a very specific message using that context, with the expectation and hope that someone else might also understand it.

The difference in the two versions of the story is subtle. In both cases a message was sent, and in both a message was received and an action was taken. But in the first story, a bridging context in the form of Morse Code was called upon to carry a very specific message, while in the second story there was no bridging context. In the second story, it was entirely the perceptiveness and deductive power of Miranda’s “hiking Mt. Ateb context” which allowed her to create for herself new information: namely that “someone out there is in trouble”.

Once More, What If Judith Wasn’t In Trouble?

Let’s take one more variation of the story to enforce this last point. Let’s say that everything happened as described, except that instead of falling down the scree, Judith purposefully rappelled down the side of the mountain. And furthermore, that instead of clinging desperately to a thorn bush, that she had actually managed to establish a bivuoac in that peculiar outpost. In this version of the story, perhaps Judith is waving her flashlight around as in our second story, only this time merely to light her little campground while fixing herself dinner.

Now imagine ranger Miranda, trained as before and with a knowledge of the trails, but without prior knowledge of anyone camping where Judith found her perch. Using her same described skills of perception and deduction, Miranda may still come to the conclusion that there was someone on the side of the mountain in trouble, and would take the aforementioned steps to effect a rescue. Only she would find that Judith was not in need of help, and is now put out by the disturbance of her relaxation by the whirring chopper blades.

In this version of the story, Miranda is still in the same context as before, and uses her perceptions and the rules of that context to reach her conclusion. The fact is, and this second version of the story should make it clear, that while information did flow from Judith to Miranda just as before, we cannot call this information a “message” carried on a medium and in a context shared by Judith and Miranda. In other words, it was not a purposeful communication across a bridging context.

No, quite simply, in both of these latter examples, Miranda’s context guided her to her perception and the creation of the knowledge that Judith was on the mountain and in trouble (even if she was mistaken on this last point in the final story).


The fact that a person who presses a flashlight button does or does not intend to send a message – to communicate through that act -defines whether we classify the information flow as being a symbollic act or not. Perhaps the person does not realize or care whether there is another person watching for a flashlight in the dark. The factthat someone sees the light and acts in response does not mean that communication has occurred. Just because information has flowed does not mean that symbols have flowed.
This is a subtle distinction but an important one.

Unmanage Master Data Management

Master Data Management is a discipline which tries to create, maintain and manage a single, standardized conceptual information model of all of an enterprise’s data structures. Taking as its goal that all IT systems eventually will be unified under a single semantic description so that information from all corners of the business can be understood and managed as a whole.

In my opinion, while I agree with the ultimate goal of information interoperability across the enterprise, I disagree with the approach usually taken to get there. A strategy that I might call:

  • Data Management with Multiple Masters
  • Uncontrolled/Unmanaged Master Data Management
  • Associative Search on an Uncontrolled Vocabulary
  • Emergent Data Management (added 2015)
  • Master-less Data Management (added 2015)

takes a different approach. The basic strategy is to permit multiple vocabularies to exist in the enterprise (one for each major context that can be identified). Then we build a cross reference of the semantics only describing the edges between these contexts (the “bridging” contexts between organizations within the enterprise), where interfaces exist. The interfaces that would be described and captured in this way would include non-automated ones (e.g., human mediated interfaces) as well as the traditionally documented software interfaces.

Instead of requiring that the entire content of each context be documented and standardized, this approach would provide the touchpoints between contexts only. New software (or business) integration tasks which the enterprise takes on would require new interfaces and new extensions of mappings, but would only have to cover the content of the new bridging context.

Information collected and maintained under this strategy would include the categorization of data element structures as follows:

  1. Data structure syntax and basic manipulations
  2. Origin Context and element Role (for example, markers versus non-markers)
  3. Storage types: transient (not stored), temporary (e.g. staging schemas and work tables), permanent (e.g., structures which are intended to provide the longest storage
  4. “Pass-through” versus “consumed” data elements. Also called “traveller” and “fodder”, these data structures and elements have no meaning and possibly no existence (respectively) in the Target Context.

For data symbols that are just “passing through” one context to another, these would be the traveller symbols (as discussed on one of my permanent pages and in the glossary) whose structure is simply moved unchanged from one context to the next, until it reaches a context which recognizes and uses them. “Fodder” symbols are used to trigger some logic or filter to change the operation of the bridging context software, but once consumed, do not move beyond the bridge.

The problem that I have encountered with MDM efforts is that they don’t try to scope themselves to what is RECOGNIZABLY REQUIRED. Instead, the focus is on the much larger, much riskier effort of the attempted elimination of local contexts within the enterprise. MDM breaks down in the moment it becomes divorced from a practical, immediate attempt to capture just what is needed today. The moment it attempts to “bank” standard symbols ahead of their usage, the MDM process becomes speculative, and proscriptive. The likelihood of wasting time on symbology which ultimately is wrong and unused is very high, once steps past the interface and into the larger contexts are taken.

Uses of Metamorphic Models in Data Management and Governance

In the Master Data Management arena, Metamorphic Models would allow the capture of the data elements necessary to stitch together an enterprise. By recognizing the information needed to pass as markers or to act as travellers, the scope of the data governance task should be reducible to a practical minimum.

Then the data governance problem can be built up only as needed. The task becomes, properly, just another project-related activity similar to Change Control and Risk Management, instead of the academic exercise into which it often devolves.

The scope of data management should focus on and document 100% of the data being moved across interfaces, whether these interfaces are automated or human-performed. Simple data can just be documented, and the equivalence of syntax and semantics captured. Data elements that act as markers for the processes should be recorded. Also all data elements/structures intended merely to make the trip as travellers should be indicated.

This approach addresses the high-value portion of the enterprise’s data structures, while minimizing work on documenting concepts which only apply within a particular context.

Bridge Contexts: Meaning in the Edgeless Boundary

Previously, I’ve written about the idea of the “edgeless boundary” between semiospheres for someone with knowledge of more than one context. This boundary is “edgeless” because to the person perceiving it, there is little or no obvious boundary.

In software systems, especially in situations where different software applications are in use, the boundary between them, by contrast, can be quite stark and apparent. I’ll describe the reasons for this in other postings at a later time. The nutshell explanation is that each software system must be constrained to a well-defined subset of concepts in order to operate consistently. The subset of reality about which a particular application system can capture data (symbols) is limited by design to those regularly observable conditions and events that are of importance to the performance of some business function.

Often (in an ideal scenario), an organization will select only one application to support one set of business functions at a time. A portfolio of applications will thus be constructed through the acquisition/development of different applications for different sets of business functions. As mentioned elsewhere on this site, sometimes an organization will have acquired more than one application of a particular type (see ERP page). 

In any case, information contained in one application oftentimes needs to be replicated into another application within the organization.  When this happens, regardless of the method by which the information is moved from one application to another, a special kind of context must be created/defined in order for the information to flow. This context is called a “bridging context” or simply a “bridge context”.

As described previously, an application system represents a mechanized perception of reality. If we anthropomorphize the application, briefly, we might say that the application forms a semiosphere consisting of the meaning projected onto its syntactic media by the human developers and its current user community, forming symbols (data) which carry the specifically intended meaning of the context.

Two applications, therefore, would present two different semiospheres. The communication of information from one semiosphere to the other occurs when the symbols of one application are deconstructed and transformed into the symbols of the other application, with or without commensurate changes in meaning. This transformation may be effected by human intervention (as through, for example, the interpretation of outputs from one system and the re-coding/data entry into the other), or by automated transformation processes of any type (i.e., other software).

“Meaning” in a Bridging Context

Bridging Contexts have unique features among the genus of contexts overall. They exist primarily to facilitate the movement of information from one context to another. The meaning contained within any Bridging Context is limited to that of the information passing across the bridge. Some of the concepts and facts of the original contexts will be interpretable (and hence will have meaning) within the bridging context only if they are used or transformed during this flow.  Additional information may exist within the bridge context, but will generally be limited to information required to perform or manage the process of transformation.

Hence, I would consider that the knowledge held or communicated by an individual (or system) operating within a bridging context which is otherwise unrelated to either of the original contexts, or of the process of transference, would existing outside of the bridging context, possibly in a third context. As described previously, the individual may or may not perceive the separation of knowledge in this manner.

Special symbols called “travellers” may flow through untouched by transformation and unrecognized within the bridging context. These symbols represent information important in the origin context which may be returned unmodified to the origin context by additional processes. During the course of their trip across the bridging context(s) and through the target contexttravellers typically will have no interpretation, and will simply be passed along in an unmodified syntactic form until returned to their origin, where they can then be interpreted again. By this definition, a traveller is a symbol that flows across a bridge context but which only has meaning in the originating context.

Given a path P from context A to context B, the subset of concepts of A that are required to fulfill the information flow over path P are meaningful within the bridging context surrounding P. Likewise, the subset of concepts of B which are evoked or generated by the information flowing through path P, is also part of the content of the bridge context.  Finally, the path P may generate or use information in the course of events which are neither part of context A nor B. This information is also contained within the bridge context.

Bridge contexts may contain more than one path, and paths may transfer meaning in any direction between the bridged contexts. For that matter, it is possible that any particular bridging context may connect more than two other contexts (for example, when an automated system called an “Operational Data Store” is constructed, or a messaging interface such as those underlying Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) components are built).

An application system itself can represent a special case of a bridging context. An application system marries the context defined by the data modeller to the context defined by the user interface designer. This is almost a trivial distinction, as the two are generally so closely linked that their divergence should not be considered a sign of separate contexts. In this usage, an application user interface can be thought of as existing in the end user’s context, and the application itself acts to bridge that end user context to the context defining the database.

The Nature and Experience of Semiosphere Boundaries

I have been having an interesting discussion with Sentence First blogger Stan Carey regarding semiosphere boundaries, and I posted the following comment on his site. I thought I’d repeat it here then elaborate on it.

I’m no expert on Lotman (author of many semiotics papers and coiner of the term “semiosphere”), having only begun to read his work, and I also recognize and agree that there is no such thing as a fixed and easily recognized boundary between semiospheres. Your comment about the boundary really being some sort of  “permeable membrane” is one I agree with. I don’t think from what I have read that Lotman would disagree with you on that point, as he describes the boundary in the following way:

Insofar as the space of the semiosphere has an abstract character, its boundary cannot be visualized by means of concrete imagination. Just as in mathematics the border represents a multiplicity of points, belonging simultaneously to both the internal and external space, the semiotic border is represented by the sum of bilingual translatable “filters”, passing through which the text is translated into another language … situated outside the given semiosphere. (“On the Semiosphere”, Juri Lotman)

I do like his biosphere analogy, and it brings to mind another possible analogy that might be useful, namely that of an “ecosystem”. I’ll be looking into that soon. My notion (and as always it is a laypersons notion) is that the problem of description of a particular ecosystem presents the same puzzle as the identification and description of a semiosphere.

What’s in the ecosystem and what’s outside of it? If we’re talking about a salt marsh ecosystem, for example, where does the geographic border lie? Which creatures are part of the system and which ones are strangers to it (just travelling through)?

If a predator in the woods abutting the salt marsh happens to occasionally eat a creature from the salt marsh when they stray too far from home, does that make the predator part of the salt marsh ecosystem or not? What if they primarily eat forest critters? What if they primarily eat salt marsh critters? What if they eat equal amounts of forest and salt marsh critters?

What we see in this example is that the predator is an edge creature relative to the defined forest and salt marsh ecosystems. When we make this story about a particular individual creature, then whether the predator is in one or another ecosystem is dependent on how that ecosystem has been defined generally.

To the creature, the distinction is meaningless. It lives in both places, walks ground that is sometimes wooded and solid and sometimes muddy and loose. It eats what it can catch from either place. From the predator’s individual point of view, the world consists of bits of both ecosystems. In fact, from their point of view they probably would not recognize that they lived on the margins of two very different environments.

Now add to this the two individual prespectives of a salt marsh prey creature and a forest prey creature. Their typical experience, understanding and adaptation is of the more frequently encountered predators in their milieu. In fact they may have evolved special protections or strategies for foiling these common dangers.

If our predator is mostly a forest feeder, then the forest prey may be well adapted to avoid it, while the salt marsh prey may not. The salt marsh prey in this case may not understand or recognize the danger at all. Or else, if the individual salt marsh creature had spent some time with his pals at the edge of the forest, he may ultimately recognize the predator, although it might take a few moments to react.

Look, an individual creature does not typically experience a disjointed reality. The transition from forest to salt marsh is gradual (but recognizable). Our predator may have a worldview that includes elements of both the forest and the salt marsh. By virtue of this combined perception, the predator may experience what would be considered neither salt marsh nor forest, but the combination and unification of this edge reality.

To turn this back into a discussion of semantics, then…

If we equate our edge creature to a person with knowledge of two different domains (yourself, for example), then we get the same questions: which domain is that person a member of? If he primarily communicates in American vernacular but occasionaly uses Irish idioms, is he more American? If the reverse is true, perhaps he is more Irish?

In my mind the distinction is not so important to the individual, but is certainly more important to the people who share more of the “core” and less of the “periphery” (as Lotman described it) of various spheres. But these distinctions are relative, and what is “core” to one person would be “periphery” to another.

Such an edge person can “digest” and understand many aspects of the “core” of each of the semiospheres they experience. But by virtue of their experiences at the edge between, they may not by fully aware of the all aspects of those cores. Their experience of the semiosphere (as we saw with our predator example) is also not disjointed, but forms a seamless continuum. also does not lack for complexity or meaning, even though it does not represent either core. In fact, the experience of the boundary will be exactly the same in form (but not in content) as the experience of someone else in the center of a semiosphere.

I also think that in the case of the semiosphere, as with our ecosystem example, the “boundary” or “permeable membrane” is generated only by the existence of individual creatures who bridge it and cross freely between the domains. In the case of human communication, however, I think we all are “bridging” these gaps all the time, so much so that we don’t usually experience the shift until we are reminded of them by an unfamiliar word. The mere fact of a term’s unfamiliarity proves the case of a boundary condition for the individual.

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