Q&A: Meaning Symbol Sign and Mind (Part 2)

On one of my recent posts, a commentor named “psycho” asked me some very good questions. I decided I needed to respond in more detail than just a single comment reply. I respond in pieces below, so just for context, here is psycho’s entire original comment.

But if you take more meanings, and put them together to get yet another meaning. Don’t you feel like those meanings were again like symbols creating a new meaning?

In my understanding, every bit of information is a symbol – what is represented by the invididual neurons in the brain. And if you take all related bits (that is neurons, symbols), and look at it as a whole, what you get is meaning.

The sentence is a symbol, and it is made of word-symbols. And the list of word-symbols makes a meaning. Which, when given a name (or feeling), becomes a symbol, that can be further involved in other meanings.

I’ll respond to each paragraph in separate posts, in order to get all of my thoughts down in a reasonably readable fashion. Part one covered the first paragraph. Here is part two where I cover the rest of my thoughts.

Symbols in the Mind

In my understanding, every bit of information is a symbol – what is represented by the invididual neurons in the brain. And if you take all related bits (that is neurons, symbols), and look at it as a whole, what you get is meaning.

I’m not a neurologist or any kind of brain scientist by any means, so I could eventually be proven wrong on this, but what a neuron represents, to me is not a symbol and not a sign and not a specific meaning. I know I read somewhere of a brain experiment (using MRIs I think) where the image of Jennifer Aniston presented visually during a brain scan caused only a single neuron to fire. I recall that the interpretation given was that the entire concept of “Jennifer Aniston” was stored in one singular neuron.

I guess I just don’t buy it. What if the meaning of that neuron was more along the lines of “a famous person whose name I forget” or “I recognize a face I’ve seen on ‘Entertainment Tonight'”? The fact of it is, the experimenters drew a conclusion on a correlation that not even their subject would be able to explain or confirm.

Then there is some hypothesis that memories and meanings are distributed across the brain in such a pattern as to suggest more of a holographic storage mechanism (where damage in one area of the brain is overcome by stimulation and growth and retraining).

I think that memory and meaning is essentially an EXPERIENCED thing. That the physical stimuli produce a complex of sensations through re-activation of neurons that causes the brain itself to “sense” the memory. I don’t think this qualifies as a symbollic sensation, being a much more holistic, “analog” experience not unlike the original. If every bit of information were a symbol, then I think we’d be just as hard-wired as computers to recognize only one set of sensations and meanings. Our experience being more fluid, it allows us to be much more creative in the aspects and portions of sensation that we recognize and name. As an individual I have full freedom to separate the signal from the noise, the foreground from the background, as I fancy. I can “slice and dice” me experience of sensation in anyway that I find meaningful, and if I communicate it to you, then you can see what I see just like that. In other words, working with the “analog” of my sensations is a much more powerful, creative endeavor than merely encoding and decoding “digital” symbols.

That’s my two cents on that thought.

Just What Is Meaning? A Lay Perspective


The Origin of Symbols, Code and Meaning

Memories are NOT CODED. They are ANALOG recordings, not unlike phonograph records and the old photographs before the invention of digital cameras. There is some evidence that memories are stored in a manner similar to holographs within the medium of the brain. Memories may include recordings of coded information, this would be how symbols are recognized.

 Only when communication between brains is needed does CODE come into play. One brain must create appropriate SYMBOLS which represent the information. These symbols must be physicalized in some manner because the only input mechanism available to the other brain are the five senses of the body. Information is packaged and lumped, nuances and unimportant details are necessarily removed, symbols are selected and generated. If the other brain is receptive, then the symbols are sensed by the body, evoking the memory centers of the second brain. Communication is completed if the second brain understands the code and “remembers” the meaning in its own analog memory.

The Origin of Language

The brain records sensory inputs as memory. The mind constructs an internal symbol system describing the sensory information in ways the human body can communicate or relate the information. Details of the input which the mind cannot put a name to may be remembered or memorable, but cannot be communicated. Have you ever experienced something that you were unable to describe to someone else who had not experienced it?

Two people who have experienced the same or similar types of events can have a conversation about it and begin to form a language. Language is a shortcut to memory. It is the human capacity for the invention of vocabulary that sets them apart from other creatures (and from computers). If two people share a new experience, they’ll be able to talk about it by recognizing the same features in the sensory record and describing it in terms that evoke the same memory in the other person. Eventually, they’ll form a unique vocabulary of short hand symbolic terms and phrases to permit efficient communications. This is how strangers who meet at 12-Step Meetings are able to express and understand each other.

 But if only one of the two persons has experienced the events, there is no referent memory in one of the two. Think of the old saw “a picture is worth a thousand words”. Have you ever heard a new musical piece and tried to explain it to someone who hasn’t heard it? It takes a lot of explanation and yet is ultimately a failure.

 Consider another example: Wine tasting connoisseurs

 These people have an intense sensitivity to subtle features of taste and smell making their experience of wine very rich with information. More importantly, they have been able to attach vocabulary to these differences in unique ways that allows them to communicate with other wine experts. Of course, their success at communicating is predicated on the existence of other individuals with similar talents and experiences. When they try to explain to someone without the sensitivity of taste, their words merely confuse or sound hilariously out of place.

 This is one example of how “context” arises in human communication.

 What does this suggest for our major theme? 

  1. The features that are recognized in the sensory record are dependent first on the individuals whose senses recorded them
  2. The features that are chosen for communication are dependent on the interests and needs of the individuals doing the communicating. Other features that at first do not seem to contribute to the remembrance of the experience are often ignored or discounted.
  3. The vocabulary describing and naming these features is dependent on both the individual who sensed and on the people to whom they try to explain the sensation. Thru trial and error, the person who is trying to communicate will hit upon terms that find resonance in their audience.

Types of Information Flow

In a previous post a week or so ago, I riffed on an example of communication between two mountain hikers suggested by Barwise and Seligman (authors of a theory of “information flow”). I made the initial distinction between information flowing within a shared context (in the example, this was the context of Morse Code and flashlight signals), and information flowing from observations of physical phenomenon.
Both types of information movement is covered by Barwise and Seligman’s theory. I propose a further classification of various examples of information flow which will become important as we discuss the operations of individuals across and within bridging contexts.

Types of Flows

Symbols are created within a context for various reasons. There’s a difference between generic information flow and symbollic communication.
Let’s consider a single event whereby information has flowed and been recognized by a person. There are three possible scenarios which may have occurred.

1. Observation/Perception: the person experiences some physical sensation; the conditions of some physical perception leads the person within the context of that perception (and his mental state) to recognize the sensation as significant. In this case, the person recognizes that something has occurred that was important enough to become consciously aware of it’s occurrence. This is new information, but is not necessarily symbollic information.

2. Inference/Deduction: A person within the mental state corresponding to a particular context applies a set of “rules of thumb” over a set of observations (of the first type, likely, but not necessarily exclusively). Drawing on logical inference defined by his current context, he draws a conclusion which follows from these observations to generate new information. This is new information in the sense that without the context to define the rules of inference, those particular perceptions would not have resulted in the “knowledge” of the inference conclusion. They would remain (or they would dissipate) uninterpretted and unrelated forever.

3. Interpretation/Translation: This is the only type of information flow that happens using exclusively symbollic mechanisms. In this type of flow, the person receiving the flow recognizes not only the physical event, but also that the observed phenomenon is symbollic: in other words, that some other person has applied additional meaning to the phenomenon (created a symbol or symbols from the physical media by attaching an additional concept to it). In this type of flow, the perceiving person doesn’t simply register the fact of the physical event, but also recognizes that the physical phenomenon satisfies some context-driven rules of material selection and construction indicating that some other person intentionally constructed it. From this knowledge, the perceiver concludes, assuming they are familiar with the encoding paradigm of the sender’s context, that there is an intended, additional message (meaning) associated with the event. The perceiving party is said to share the context of the sending party if they are also able to interpret/translate the perceived physical sign to recognize the concepts placed there by the sender. In this scenario, the person recieving the message is NOT creating new information. All of the information of this flow was first realized and generated by the message’s sender. (This will be an important detail later as we apply this trichotomy to the operation of software.)

In all three types of information flows, as described by Barwise and Seligman, the flow is dependent on the regularities of the physical world. This regularity requirement applies from the regularity of physical phenomenon, to the reliability of the perceptual apparatus of the perceiver, all the way to the consistency of the encoding paradigm defined by the sender’s context.

Peirce’s Modes of Relationship

According to a terrific survey book on semiotics by Daniel Chandler that I’m reading now, Charles Peirce defined types of signs by whether they were symbollic, iconic, or indexical. If I understand Chandler’s summary, the first two examples of information flow I’ve described are at minimum dependent on Peirce’s indexical signs, alternatively called “natural signs”, because these are the natural perception of reality independent of context. Both the iconic and symbollic signs are only recognizable within a context making both fall under my “interpretation” type of information flow.

For the most part, I will treat the iconic and symbollic signs as the same sort of thing for now.

What a Context Is: Information Flow Theory

I’ve been busy lately, and let this discussion lapse for a bit. Let’s see if I can kickstart it again.

Sometimes, information flows from the physical world to a person who observes and interprets his perceptions to create and recognize new knowledge. Sometimes, someone creates a message in a physical medium and “sends” it into the world hoping that there will be another person who not only can sense it, but can recognize it as a message and can receive the information layered on top of the physical perception. The first is an example of simple observation and perception, the second is an example of communication within a context. While both rely on the perception of physical reality by the observer, they are fundamentally, though subtlety, different.

I have been reading a book on the mathematical theory underlying the “flow” of “information” in the real world, and while I don’t yet really understand the theory, there are some points the book is failing to make about context which I think are important.

Barwise, Jon and Seligman, Jerry, Information Flow: The Logic of Distributed Systems, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Not that the book was intended to cover the concept of context, per se, being an attempt to lay out a mathematical/logical framework for describing the flow of information across, through and between physical systems. It does have an extensive section on “local logics” which when I understand it better may help me describe my own ideas about context in a formal manner.

What struck me, and forms the origin point of today’s discussion on contexts, is the example the authors use to introduce and illustrate the technical discussion. And as you will see, it is not just the example given, but variations of it that I will use to elucidate better what a context is and is not. To get to the meat of my thinking, here is their example, as written on pages 4-5.

Judith, a keen but inexperienced mountaineer, embarked on an ascent of Mt. Ateb. She took with her a compass, a flashlight, a topographic map, and a bar of Lindt bittersweet chocolate. The map was made ten years previously, but she judged that the mountain would not have changed too much. Reaching the peak shortly after 2 P. M. she paused to eat two squares of chocolate and reflect on the majesty of her surroundings.

At 2:10 P. M. she set about the descent. Encouraged by the ease of the day’s climb, she decided to take a different route down. It was clearly indicated on the map and clearly marked on the upper slopes, but as she descended the helpful little piles of stones left by previous hikers petered out. Before long she found herself struggling to make sense of compass bearings taken from ambiguously positioned rocky outcrops and the haphazard tree line below. By 4 P. M. Judith was hopelessly lost.

Scrambling down a scree slope, motivated only by the thought that down was a better bet than up, the loose stones betrayed her, and she tumbled a hundred feet before breaking her fall against a hardy uplands thorn. Clinging to the bush and wincing atthe pain in her left leg, she took stock. It would soon be dark. Above her lay the treacherous scree, below her were perils as yet unknown. She ate the rest of the chocolate.

Suddenly, she remembered the flashlight. It was still working. She began to flash out into the twilight. By a miracle, her signal was seen by another day hiker, who was already near the foot of the mountain. Miranda quickly recognized the dots and dashes of the SOS and hurried on to her car where she phoned Mountain Rescue. Only twenty minutes later the searchlight from a helicopter scanned the precipitous east face of Mt. Ateb, illuminating the frightened Judith, still clinging to the thorn bush but now waving joyously at the aircraft.

Was Judith Lucky That Miranda Knew Morse Code?

In a word, yes. In so many ways:

  • like the fact that Miranda was near the bottom of the mountain,
  • that she had a clear view of the side of the mountain where Judith lay,
  • that she had a cell phone at the car,
  • and most importantly, Judith was indeed lucky that Miranda knew the Morse code for “SOS”.

In fact, it was also lucky that Judith herself knew the code. So in the story as given, since Judith knew the code to use when she found herself in trouble, she used her light as the syntactic medium in which she encoded a message of her need for help. The fact that Morse code is a globally standard coding scheme simply meant that both Judith and Miranda both shared a common context without ever having met. The fact of their shared knowledge of the code provided the context by which Judith was able to get her message to Miranda.

What if Miranda Didn’t Know Morse Code

Things could have been much worse for Judith if either of them had no knowledge of the code, or if neither of them did. In addition, it was lucky that Miranda was somehow aware (or realized as she was watching) that a flashing light could be used to signify such a code, and that she then obviously deduced from the repeated pattern that someone was sending a message.

Imagine what might have happened if Miranda had seen the flashing light, but didn’t recognize it as a code, and therefore didn’t try to translate what she was seeing. Instead of reacting by calling for help, she might have thought to herself “Oh look, there’s a light up on the mountain. I wonder what that is?” but then gone on about her business.

In other words, Miranda could have observed her environment and perceived the flashing light but concluded that it was simply a physical phenomenon of no particular import. She may have perceived the signal but failed to recognize it as a message. In which case, this would show that Judith and Miranda had failed to establish a context for the communication.

What if Judith didn’t know Morse Code?

If Judith didn’t know Morse Code, perhaps she would still have started waving her flashlight around. Miranda having seen the light would have no reason to recognize a code.

Would this mean Judith would be out of luck? Not necessarily, if Miranda was also an experienced hiker. Miranda being in the context of hiking, it might occur to her that there shouldn’t be a light on that part of the mountain at that moment in time. She might think to herself that the random way the light was moving, plus its position on the mountain compared with where the safe trails were, added up to someone in distress.

In this case, a message has still been sent from Judith to Miranda, with the same result. The context that Miranda was thinking in plus her perception and prior knowledge of the mountain trails, allowed her to reach a conclusion that there was someone on the mountain in trouble. But it is important to note that Judith was not in the same context as Miranda.

In fact, if Miranda was a ranger, she may have been trained to look for and recognize the behavior of people in distress. In this example, we must conclude that Judith was not actually participating in the context with Miranda. It was Miranda’s knowledge of and mindset regarding her perceptions of the dangerous mountain environment which led her to deduce the existence of a person in trouble, not the fact of Judith’s trying to send a message.

Yes, this Judith tried to send a message, but she couldn’t have known that her random wavings would be recognized in anyway. Whereas the Judith who used Morse code actually knew of a context and encoded a very specific message using that context, with the expectation and hope that someone else might also understand it.

The difference in the two versions of the story is subtle. In both cases a message was sent, and in both a message was received and an action was taken. But in the first story, a bridging context in the form of Morse Code was called upon to carry a very specific message, while in the second story there was no bridging context. In the second story, it was entirely the perceptiveness and deductive power of Miranda’s “hiking Mt. Ateb context” which allowed her to create for herself new information: namely that “someone out there is in trouble”.

Once More, What If Judith Wasn’t In Trouble?

Let’s take one more variation of the story to enforce this last point. Let’s say that everything happened as described, except that instead of falling down the scree, Judith purposefully rappelled down the side of the mountain. And furthermore, that instead of clinging desperately to a thorn bush, that she had actually managed to establish a bivuoac in that peculiar outpost. In this version of the story, perhaps Judith is waving her flashlight around as in our second story, only this time merely to light her little campground while fixing herself dinner.

Now imagine ranger Miranda, trained as before and with a knowledge of the trails, but without prior knowledge of anyone camping where Judith found her perch. Using her same described skills of perception and deduction, Miranda may still come to the conclusion that there was someone on the side of the mountain in trouble, and would take the aforementioned steps to effect a rescue. Only she would find that Judith was not in need of help, and is now put out by the disturbance of her relaxation by the whirring chopper blades.

In this version of the story, Miranda is still in the same context as before, and uses her perceptions and the rules of that context to reach her conclusion. The fact is, and this second version of the story should make it clear, that while information did flow from Judith to Miranda just as before, we cannot call this information a “message” carried on a medium and in a context shared by Judith and Miranda. In other words, it was not a purposeful communication across a bridging context.

No, quite simply, in both of these latter examples, Miranda’s context guided her to her perception and the creation of the knowledge that Judith was on the mountain and in trouble (even if she was mistaken on this last point in the final story).


The fact that a person who presses a flashlight button does or does not intend to send a message – to communicate through that act -defines whether we classify the information flow as being a symbollic act or not. Perhaps the person does not realize or care whether there is another person watching for a flashlight in the dark. The factthat someone sees the light and acts in response does not mean that communication has occurred. Just because information has flowed does not mean that symbols have flowed.
This is a subtle distinction but an important one.

Context As Observer

Consider a context as a reflection of one point of view. As a frame or lense through which the external environment is observed. The “things” that “matter” to the context are the events or features which are both:

  • VISIBLE – or otherwise perceptible, and
  • NAMEABLE – or describable/categorizable

If something is imperceptible, then obviously there will be nothing to notice – no “referent”. In this case, imagined perceptions will be included as “perceptible”. If the thing which could be perceived is not nameable or otherwise describable within the context, then the context hasn’t noticed it and it does not exist.

That is to say, that a reality exists independent of any particular context, but in terms of the point of view of the context, that which the context has no expression for lies outside of the context. If context is the perceiver, then the indescribable reality outside of the context may as well not exist, for all the benefit the context gains from it.

Every context that exists is limited to the perception of  only a subset of reality. Is there a limit to the perception of reality if we take into account the sum total of all contexts in existence today, and all those which existed in the past? Yes, else one would expect that invention and discovery would cease.

Context is a feature of communication. It is not reality, which is the referent of the communication.

An example comes to mind from the physical world. One context may be the one in which the speed of a particle is important. Another context may be the one in which the position of the particle in space and time is important. Then there’s the context of Quantum Mechanics which is the one which first recognized that there were two other contexts (although it did not call them this) and that one interferes with the other. In QM, due to the known limitations of the physical world and our ability to perceive it at a particular level, these two contexts can never observe the same exact phenomenon. An observer in one context that observes one aspect of the particle necessarily changes the condition of the particle so that the other condition is no longer perceptible.

This seems really trivial, until we broaden the idea out to more complex contexts. The world is an analog, continuous place. Even the most complex context however can only perceive and name certain aspects, and is unaware of or finds inexpressible other aspects.

This is the place where poets and artists find creative expression and energy, between the lines of the necessarily constrained contexts of their own ability to communicate.

Out of the whole continuity of experience and phenomena which is the world about us, we are selective about the things we notice and think and speak about. Why one observation is made instead of another is based wholly on the things we find “remarkable”.

We remark on the things that are remarkable to us. By this I mean, the things we wish to convey or communicate are the things we find words to express. This “finding of words” includes inventing words and turns of phrase. After all, we each bring to the human table a uniqueness of vision commensurate to our talents, proclivities and experience.

Those to whom we successfully impart our observations, thru the act of their understanding the message, enter into the context of discourse of those observations. Once in that context, they may corroborate or elaborate on my original observations, broadening and enriching the context. Over time our collective observations become codified and regular, our terminology more richly evocative and concise, such that we may begin to speak in a shorthand.

Where a paragraph once was needed, now a sentence – where once a sentence now a single term…

As we start recognizing more and more examples of a phenomena, we invent a sublanguage which, when used within the context (and with the proper participants – see definition of context – i.e., with other people who share this context) is perfectly understandable.

An extreme example of differences in contexts would be the contrast of elementary school arithmetics versus obscure branches of mathematics research. The concepts which matter in the one are inconceivable in the other, the notation and terminology of the one are indecipherable in the other.

Consider the origin and usage of the term “ponzi scheme”. The original of the type was perpetrated by a man named “Ponzi”. Anyone who has operated a similar scheme since can now be referred to using the name of one notorious example. In recent years, the largest ponzi scheme ever perpetrated was the brainchild of Bernie Madoff. Time will tell if future outrageously immense ponzi schemes will be given a new moniker.

We might ask: “In what sense do we say that a “context” is an “observer”? There are a few ways we can use this analogy. First, a context is the product of communication among indidivual humans. It is the participation in the communication, in sending and receiving message, that creates the scope of the communication. What is communicated is the shared observations of the participant community.

Context Is:

Communication == Community == Communication

Information transfer among a group of individuals who share a common interest.

The language used is necessarily constrained, at first informally but later perhaps more rigidly as communication becomes more focused. Difficult observations require lots of talk. Once the idea has been grasped, however, less and less is needed to evoke the memory of the original idea, until a single term from the original description can be used as a stand-in.

It is not the abstract notion of a context that actually does the observing. Rather it is the community members themselves, the humans, who do the observing. The subject of communication is necessarily the things of interest to the community. But an individual who observes something is not necessarily participating in the context. Only the observations that are shared and received are part of the context.

A second sense in which the context can be described as the observer at an abstract level. While the context is formed from the collective interests and communication of the group of humans, eventually, the context becomes prescriptive. The extent and content of the shared sublanguage then defines the type and content of the observations that can be made by the members of the context. An observation that falls outside of the context’s prescriptive rules for content and structure is likely not to be understood (received). If it is not received, it may as well not have happened, hence such messages fall out of context.  The more constrained and formalized the context, the more explicit and succinct the observations that can be carried by that context, but also the fewer the variety of observations.

Successful study of the constraints and observations within a context occurs in much of the “social sciences”. Much can be deduced about what is important within a community by analysing the rules and limits of the communication that community’s context permits. In particular, a sense of the portion of existence important to the context can be deduced from the study of the observations communicated within that context.

A Concept is Born: Sense Memory and Name Creation

June 24, 1988

Experience is characterized by memory of sensual information in all its detail. Analysis of this data can be retroactively applied. I can remember that:

“Yes, the sky was grey and windy just prior to the tree falling behind me.”

and therefore come to understand a set of events later, in some other context. Using this sensual memory aids abstraction and analysis because it acts as the raw material out of which abstractions can be built. Thus it is possible at a later date to reflect on past events and discover related occurences where before there was unorganized memory.

Learning of patterns is continuous:

“What was that?”

This question initially gets very simplistic answers when asked by toddlers and children. It takes nearly 20 years for humans to talk about philosophy in a formal way. But as slight variations to the simple occurences of events are experienced, the agent (learner) begins to organize subclasses of the same general event, especially if the social world provides him a useful distinction to use to characterize the subclass. In doing so, the subclass name becomes a synonym for the general idea.

Creative research by the agent (learner) is characterized by the creation of new distinguishing marks and the choosing of a class name for those marks. Communication with others regarding the subclass then becomes a matter of describing those marks, providing the short hand name, and obtaining agreement from the others that both the marks and the name are apropos.

And thus a concept is born…

Context is Knowing Who You Are Talking To

A few years ago I ran across some very interesting research into the origins of language performed by Luc Steels at the Artifical Intelligence Laboratory of Virje Universiteit Brussel (See “Synthesising the Origins of Language and Meaning Using Co-Evolution, Self-Organisation and Level Formation“, Luc Steels, July 26, 1996. ). He basically set up some robots and had them play what he called “language games”.  Here’s part of the Abstract:

The paper reports on experiments in which robotic agents and software agents are set up to originate language and meaning. The experiments test the hypothesis that mechanisms for generating complexity commonly found in biosystems, in particular self-organisation, co-evolution, and level formation, also may explain the spontaneous formation, adaptation, and growth in complexity of language. Keywords: origins of language, origins of meaning, self-organisation, distributed agents, open systems. 1 Introduction A good way to test a model of a particular phenomenon is to build simulations or artificial systems that exhibit the same or similar phenomena as one tries to model. This methodology can also be applied to the problem of the origins of language and meaning. Concretely, experiments with robotic agents and software agents could be set up to test whether certain hypothesised mechanisms indeed lead to the formation of language and the creation of new meaning.

Interestingly enough, I ran into this work a couple years after I had written down an early musing about context (see my earlier post “The origin of a context“). At the time that I ran into Luc Steels research, I was struck with how similarly I had framed the issue. While his experiments were about much more than context, it certainly was encouraging to me that the results of the experiments he carried out corroborated my naive expressions.

Apparently, a few years later (1999-2000), the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at Vrije University continued the experiment, including a much richer experimental and linguistic setup than the original work. The introduction to this further research (apparently funded in part by Sony) even depicts a “robot” conversation very much like the conversation I describe in my post (only with better graphics…)

The basic setup of the experiment was as follows. Two computers, two digital cameras, and microphones and speakers permitting the software to “talk”. The cameras had some sort of pointing mechanism (laser pointers, I think) and faced a white board on which various shapes of different colors were arrayed randomly. The two software agents took turns pointing their laser pointers at the shapes and then generating various sounds. As the game continued, each agent would try to mimic the sounds they heard each other make while pointing at specific objects. Over time, the two agents were able to replicate the sounds when pointing at the same objects.

In terms of what I consider to be context, these experiments showed that it was possible for two “autonomous agents” to come to agreement on the “terminology” they would mutually use to refer to the same external perceptions (images of colored objects seen through a digital camera). Once trained, the two agents could “converse” about the objects, even pointing them out to each other and correctly finding the objects referred to when mentioned.

These experiments also showed that if you take software agents who have been trained separately (with other partner agents) and put them together, they will go through a period of renegotiation of terms and pronunciations. The robot experiments show a dramatic, destructive period in which the robots almost start over, generating an entirely new language, but finally the two agents again converge on something they agree on.

I’m not sure if the study continued to research context, per se. The later study included “mobile” agents and permitted interactions with several agents in a consecutive fashion. This showed the slow “evolution” of the language (a convergence of terminology amongst several agents) among a larger group of agents. I suspect, that unless the experimenters explicitly looked for this, they may have missed this detail (I’d be interested in finding out).

What would have been terrific is if the agent kept track of WHO it was talking to as well as what was being talked about. It is that extra piece of information which makes up a context. If an agent were able to learn the terminology of one agent, then learn the language of another, it could act as a translator between the two by keeping track of who it was talking with (and switching contexts…). Under my view, context is just the recognition of who I’m talking to and thus the selection of the correct variant of language and terminology to adapt to that audience.

Human ability to switch contexts so easily is due to our ability to remember how various concepts are described amongst specific communities. I’ve always said, until the computer can have a conversation with me and then come up with its own data structures to represent the concepts we discuss, I’ll be employed… Now I’m getting a little worried…

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